**Conscience, Character, and Culture**  
**15th International Conference on Ethics Across the Curriculum**

**Presentation Abstracts**

**Minerva Ahumada**  
LaGuardia Community College  
**Thursday, October 3, 3:15pm (Agricultural Science)**

**Reading, Alterity, and Justice: A Novel's Way to Global Citizenship**

According to the major proponents of narrative ethics, novels are the perfect way to develop, prompt, and stimulate the moral imagination. What we read—and how we read it—exposes us not only to other worlds but to layers of ourselves of which we may not have been entirely aware. This is the way in which Nussbaum, McIntyre, and Booth (amongst others) urge us to an examination of moral philosophy in close proximity to literature.

A question seems to arise from this claim—read, yes! But what should we read? Most of the proponents of narrative ethics use examples of the literary canon in their work. Proust, Dickens, and James make more than cameos in the narrative ethics literature. And yet, I will claim, their works are not works through which we can guide ourselves or our students in a globalized world. The canon does not represent the complexity of human experience in our contemporary world—it addresses the complexities of being of a certain group of people, with whom many readers cannot even identify. Jacques Derrida, in his keynote address to the conference “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,” says: “C’est ici un devoir, je dois m’adresser a vous en anglais. This is an obligation, I must address myself to you in English” (3). Because he is talking in an American venue, one understands why he must do so. But Derrida himself opens up a very interesting path when he says that he “must speak in a language that is not [his] own because that will be more just [...] in the sense of justice [...] it is more just to speak the language of the majority, especially when, through hospitality, it grants the foreigner the right to speak” (5).

When we only choose texts that are part of the “great books” canon in order to have our students and/or peers discuss ideas of ethics or justice, we do it out of an obligation: that of broadening our students’ horizons, to help in their development as moral agents, of contributing to the fundamental core values of society. However, and this is my major claim, by using this particular kind of literature, we also do injustice to our students and to the goal we are proclaiming.

Based on the experiences I had teaching works such as Zeitoun and Death and the Maiden to my Ethics classes, I want to propose that we do not choose texts that must translate themselves of the majority, but that we must let the foreigner speak. It is by choosing texts that highlight the alterity of certain characters that the readers get to experience their own alterity. It is this confrontation that is necessary in order to bring justice into existence.

The company we keep, to use Booth’s famous title, also signals the way in which we allow for the other to speak. Based on an analysis of narrative ethicists such as Nussbaum, Ricoeur, Booth, and McIntire joined by seminal ideas presented by philosophers such as Derrida, Spivak, and Anzaldua, I propose that the company we keep must be one that readers find relatable, that keeps the reader trying to figure out the text, that makes the reader feel challenge as an other, and that effectively introduces us to the lives of those who are not usually part of the majority. Keeping these criteria in mind, one can choose novels, cases, or even short stories that highlight the need for moral philosophy in and outside the academic setting.
Lauren Arcila  
Independent Scholar  
Saturday, October 5, 10:30am (Weyerhauser)

Conceptions of Moral Conscience
The expression conscience has philosophical and religious meanings, in addition to everyday uses. The etymology and history of its uses reveal an old and complex thread of conceptions and assumptions, yet the concept of “conscience” does not have a central place in contemporary ethical theory or in practical ethics. I seek to explore the concept of “conscience” and its significance for moral theory. To this end, I propose to examine Douglass C. Langston’s historical and analytic account of conscience, particularly the claim that the concept includes the sharing of moral knowledge with others, and not merely the awareness or apprehension of what an individual should do. Whether or not this expanded notion of “conscience” can be traced back to ancient sources is a question in need of attention. Langston claims that we can find in Plato and Aristotle serious discussions of “conscience” in the sense he intends, and that important features of the concept, lost in the discussions of the patristic period of Christianity, need to be brought back into ethical theory and especially into virtue ethics. I explore these claims and the historical case made for them in order to assess the significance of conscience as a moral concept.

Jared Aslakson  
Western Michigan University  
Friday, October 4, 10:45am (Agricultural Science)

The Compassionate Animal: Whether Compassion is Fundamental to the Extension of Justice to non-human Animals
The debate over what sort of duties, if any, are owed to animals has largely centered on whether mistreatment of animals is wrong in a way that can be considered a violation of justice. A violation of justice, then, would need to be distinguished from other sorts of wrongdoing. For example, although most people consider gratuitous lying to be wrong, lying does not readily strike one as being an injustice. The general consensus of this debate indicates that animals either are owed justice or they are not, but if they are not owed justice they nonetheless deserve to be treated humanely and gently. Discussions that explore our moral commitments to animals based on this dichotomy rarely suppose that compassion is a source of, rather than a substitute for information about the types of beings owed justice and as a motivation for acting on our conception of justice.

This paper engages with an article by Martha Nussbaum entitled “Beyond Compassion and Humanity”. Nussbaum develops a capabilities-based approach toward animals, suggesting that our relationship to them be defined in terms of irreducible wonder toward the biological world. From this wonder, a respect for the capabilities of animals becomes the motivation for granting some animals a set of basic entitlements, and that violation of these entitlements constitutes an injustice against the animal. The capabilities approach and political notion of justice advocated by Nussbaum is contrasted with David Hume’s comments on justice as social utility and our duties to animals in Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume suggests that animals do not meet the criteria for participating in a social effort to enhance utility; hence they are not entitled to the protection of justice.

Nevertheless, the clear ability of animals to suffer indicates compassion is warranted in our dealing with animals. I will point out why Nussbaum’s account of justice and its applicability to animals is preferable to Hume’s, but not without suggesting why she has underplayed the role and value of compassion in recognizing some animals as beings that deserve justice. Respect for a creature’s ability to flourish is indeed essential to a successful extension of justice to animals. However, antecedent knowledge of a creature’s vulnerability and witnessing the suffering of animals are essential to our conception of what the demands of justice require and also as recognition of concrete instances of injustice against animals, respectively.
Innovative Approaches to Teaching Ethics: Finance, Investment, MBAs

This paper aims to identify effective ways of embedding ethics and integrity into finance and investment curricula, particularly at the post-graduate level, but also among employers, based on experience mainly in the UK, and also in the US. It considers various approaches advocated by professional associations of finance and investment, as well as methods employed by business schools, employers and training providers in those environments.

The finance and investment sphere is frequently cited as lacking conscience, especially in recent years. Having established that ethics can be effectively taught (and learned), the paper focuses on online and face-to-face delivery modes, and forms of assessment. Interactive approaches appear to carry the most benefit, in terms of raising awareness of the importance of ethics and identifying and dealing with ethical dilemmas effectively. Less conclusive, however, is the utility of ethics training in trying to prevent unethical behaviour in a professional (or personal) capacity. Critical factors here include the importance of organizational culture in embedding appropriate behaviors, supported by codes of conduct, whistle-blowing mechanisms and demonstrations of character by leaders. One problem is gauging the propensity of an individual to engage in unethical behaviour, using an assessment as a diagnostic tool. Another problem following from that is judging the effectiveness of an ethics training program in helping to reduce these propensities going forward. Some tentative conclusions are drawn, inviting further investigation.

Reflexive Principilism in an Online Context

Reflexive principilism an approach to ethics education developed in response to the growing call for ethics education and moral integrity in science and engineering. Under development as part of a three-year project funded by the National Science Foundation’s Ethics Education in Science and Engineering program (award #1237868), reflexive principilism seeks to provide a structured way of reasoning morally to science and engineering graduate students that avoids the twin limitations of overly narrow code-based approaches and overly broad theory-based approaches. Our multidisciplinary team of engineering, communication, and ethics educators is developing and testing a pedagogical framework of scaffolded, integrated, and reflexive analysis (SIRA) of ethics case studies for reflexive principilism to provide more effective development of ethical reasoning for engineering ethics education.

Reflexive principilism provides structure for ethical decision-making and, we think, an avenue for the education and ongoing training of conscientious engineering professionals. It draws on the principilist approach of Beauchamp and Childress, offering four core moral guidelines that are prioritized and specified in the context of individual cases. This methodology aligns well with engineering education; specifically, it shares parallels with the design process. Like the process of design, reflexive principilism demands an iterative process of reflection with the goal that conscious thoughtful reflection become habituated as internal reflexion.

Furthermore, it is uniquely adaptable to online education. As such, it responds to a second problem of ethics education: that of a shortage of curricular space. By scaffolding learning and integrating interactive digital technologies in a unique online modular structure, we seek to utilize online interactivity to bolster the reflectivity essential to the principilism approach.

In this presentation I will describe reflexive principilism in detail, juxtaposing it against available alternatives in the ethics education landscape and situating it in the context of science and engineering education. I will then argue that it is uniquely adaptable to online education, and will demonstrate the latest stage in development of a unique
online modular ethics education structure as part of the ongoing EESE grant project at Purdue University. The goal of this structure is to enable faculty members and students to develop course-relevant and discipline-specific case studies within this online reflexive principlism framework. Additionally, I will articulate and analyze some initial assessment data from two graduate-level pilot courses, offered in the first year of the three year of grant funding. Early results point to at least two points of ongoing discussion relevant to the session: 1) how can we most effectively assess moral development? and 2) how can we most effectively articulate the differences between moral reasoning and ethical training?

In developing a fundamentally principlist approach to engineering ethics can better meet the goals of engineering ethics education. Such an approach contextualizes moral reasoning in ways that allow engineering students to more efficiently and effectively incorporate theory into practice and has applicability across science and engineering curricula where the art of moral reasoning and the best practices of ethical education continue to be developed.

Sandra Borden  
Western Michigan University  
Friday, October 4, 1:00pm (Agricultural Science)

Hospitality and Diversity
Difference is seen as an increasingly salient aspect of life in the 21st century. One reason for this is the way in which new technologies are changing our sense of time and space and confronting us frequently with representations of the Other. One approach to accommodating difference is tolerance, which emphasizes non-interference in the affairs of others. However, this can amount to little more than peaceful co-existence with little incentive to engage proactively with alternative ways of life. This tendency poses a particular challenge for the media, as audiences do not have an immediate reason to do anything after seeing or hearing the far-away Other.

Scholars in a number of disciplines – especially religion, political science and philosophy – have shown interest in hospitality as an alternative way to approach difference ethically. Theologian Luke Bretherton (2006) has suggested a focus on concrete practices of hospitality for engaging with others from incommensurable traditions rather than searching for a public reason standard that is presumed to be universally intelligible or mastering a “foreign language” in order to dialogue rationally across traditions about their respective merits. An advantage of hospitality practices, he argued, is that they enable particular moral communities to remain faithful to their deeply held commitments while making room for non-members to witness, and perhaps join in, the actions they inspire without having to agree on first principles.

So far, the most substantive discussion of media hospitality was offered by the late Roger Silverstone (2007), who suggested it should be a normative foundation for a new representational ethics on a global scale. The purpose of this paper is to survey these and other conceptions of hospitality in various literatures. I will map out different hostilities according to the ends pursued within the host-host relationship: companionship, assimilation, benevolence, mutual advantage, or mutual understanding. In particular, I will focus on the risk and promise of hospitality practices as a way of engaging difference in light of the conference’s theme of “Conscience, Character, and Culture”: Although there is the possibility of mutual transformation in hospitable encounters, there is also the risk that one will betray one’s own deeply held commitments in order to welcome and to understand the Other.

Returning to the media’s role in curating our encounters with difference, I will offer suggestions for a range of media hospitalities that avoid the polarities of either appropriating the Other or surrendering to the Other. Finally, I will highlight the limits of practices of media hospitality and suggest future questions for research.
Jon Borowicz
Milwaukee School of Engineering
Friday, October 4, 1:00pm (Weyerhauser)

Conscience, Taste, and Arrogance
For this paper, I propose to invoke the concept of moral taste as a response to the moral hazard of thoughtlessness. In particular, I will argue that the active cultivation of taste entails activities which publicly disclose one’s taste, simultaneously making one’s own and others’ taste more discerning. What is most significant about taste as a moral phenomenon is exactly its resistance to thoughtlessness, a problem which by and large has received little attention in the literature of moral philosophy.

A notable exception to the last remark has been the work of Hannah Arendt and her commentator, Dana Villa. Arendt believed that conscience is a “byproduct” of thinking, and that while everyone has the native capacity to think, relatively few do. This sounds bad for the institution of morality, and in fact Arendt was quite pessimistic about its prospects. Villa has recently argued for a “moderately alienated” model of citizenship based on a moral individualism whose representative figure is Socrates. Heavily indebted to Arendt, Villa argues that Arendt fails to acknowledge the broader political and moral significance of her later theory of thinking and judgment. In her important essay, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” having in mind the twentieth century events of Nazism and Stalinism, Arendt limits the political and moral significance of thinking to its enabling the dissident judgment which makes political withdrawal possible. Villa argues that Arendt’s concept of thinking as musing as a discrete activity requiring its own place and time suggests the possibility of a Socratic form of citizenship whose characteristic activity is a distanced and critical reflection on thoughtlessly applied, conventionally-held, moral beliefs.

Two things are at stake in Villa’s proposed model: thoughtlessness and its amelioration as moral and philosophical problems. Being sympathetic to Villa’s project, problems of the motivation and practical plausibility of thinking as a practice are the occasion of this paper. Arendt’s thought on taste affords resources which neither she nor Villa employ as a response to thoughtlessness. What taste captures of the moral life is a characteristic awareness of similarity and distance. In particular, taste provides an incentive for an agonistic assertion of difference, yielding potentially either the persuasion of others or a change in one’s own perspective, something for which there is at least a psychological disincentive in moral life. To this extent, the notion of taste has considerable potential for moral education. The cultivation of taste has this potential because it implies the publicity of one’s responses. Following Kant’s treatment of taste in the Critique of Judgment, I will argue that taste not only seeks opportunities for its application, but entails activities of its public assertion.

Finally, taste’s implication of publicity and community suggest the possibility of its cultivation in particular professional communities. The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of what such practices of moral communication might involve.

Kathleen Burke
Simon Fraser University
Friday, October 4, 10:45am (Weyerhauser)

“Right has a long and intricate name”:
Teaching Business Ethics using the poetry of William Stafford
Poetry is a valuable tool for honing moral discernment in the classroom. Much of its utility resides in the fact that it does not approach the subject of ethics head-on; rather it is more subtly instructive. I use four of William Stafford’s poems in a progressive manner to teach Business Ethics. These works promote a number of pedagogical objectives: assisting students to identify and recognize the significance of their core values; alerting students to the risks of moral inertia; promoting discussion of the pressures to step away from one’s convictions; and exploring the factors which serve as situational cues for formulating a ‘right’ course of action. Ethics education requires, among other things, students to cultivate moral awareness and judgment. The purpose of this pedagogical demonstration
is to show how select Stafford poems serve as reflection and discussion prompts necessary to explore the complexity and possibility of character development in the workplace.

Kitrina Carlson  
University of Wisconsin-Stout  
Thursday, October 3, 1:30pm (Wells Fargo)

Promoting an Inclusive Excellence Ethic in a First-Year Seminar Course  
The Chancellor’s Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Coalition (CEDIC) at the University of Wisconsin-Stout defines “Inclusive Excellence” as cultivating an environment that values the presence and participation of individuals who differ by age, race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, country of origin, and ability as well as cultural, political, religious, or other affiliations. The Applied Science program at the University of Wisconsin-Stout has incorporated diversity awareness education into the Applied Science Profession I (APSC 101) first year seminar course since fall 2009, with the expectation that students will develop an inclusive excellence ethic by becoming aware of ways they can support a more inclusive campus community and an increasingly culturally diverse work environment.

To date, over two hundred APSC-101 students have been involved with in-classroom and out-of-classroom diversity awareness experiences. Results from the fall 2012 course assessment survey demonstrate that students who complete the APSC-101 course are more likely to believe it’s important to take courses that help them become more culturally aware, to feel comfortable working at a place of employment that is culturally diverse, to socialize with students from different cultural groups, and to become an active ally by taking a stand against observed biased behaviors. An evaluation of the long-term effectiveness of the APSC-101 Inclusive Excellence programming indicates that students are continuing to develop a more inclusive ethic that is leading to actions in taking a stand against biased language and behaviors. The results of this study demonstrate that one strategy for effectively engaging students in diversity awareness programming earlier in their college careers is through a first-year seminar course required by an academic program.

The APSCI-101 model for promoting an inclusive excellence ethic can be incorporated into first-year program requirements for any academic program. We believe this model may serve as initial scaffolding for infusing ethics throughout the academic career, and has the potential to expose students to social responsibility programming earlier in their academic careers, making it more likely they will engage in similar curricular and co-curricular opportunities throughout their college experience.

Gary Comstock  
North Carolina State University  
Friday, October 4, 2:45pm (Wells Fargo)

A Philosophical Guide to the Responsible Conduct of Research  
The objective of this paper / pedagogical demonstration is to explore the role of ethical theory in teaching responsible conduct of research (RCR) using as a guide a new textbook, Gary Comstock’s Research Ethics: A Philosophical Guide to the Responsible Conduct of Research (Cambridge University Press, 2013). The presentation will discuss the role of ethical theory in graduate-level courses devoted to RCR. The book organizes all RCR topics according to a step-by-step decision-making procedure and, it will be argued, is useful for students in all disciplines, from natural sciences to social sciences and from engineering to medicine. The book presents a novel pedagogical method, the main goal of which is to stimulate readers to ask questions rather than to memorize rules and regulations.

Education in the responsible conduct of research typically takes the form of online instructions about rules, regulations, and policies. Research Ethics takes a different approach and emphasizes the art of philosophical
decision-making. Part A introduces egoism and explains that it is in the individual’s own interest to avoid misconduct, fabrication of data, plagiarism and bias. Part B explains contractualism and covers issues of authorship, peer review and responsible use of statistics. Part C introduces moral rights as the basis of informed consent, the use of humans in research, mentoring, intellectual property and conflicts of interests. Part D uses two-level utilitarianism to explore the possibilities and limits of the experimental use of animals, duties to the environment and future generations, and the social responsibilities of researchers. The paper / demonstration will bring a fresh perspective to research ethics pedagogy by engaging the moral imagination.

Ray Devettere
Emmanuel College
Friday, October 4, 9:00am (Agricultural Science)

Mindfulness Exercises and Ethics
Recent decades have seen a growing interest on college and university campuses in both the study of contemplative learning and mindfulness by cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists, and the implementation of mindfulness practices such as meditation and Yoga.

Although mindfulness, contemplation, and meditation are expanding in popular culture and higher education there are no definitive definitions of these practices. In general we may describe these practices as repetitive mental and imaginative training exercises that enable and encourage us to do three things: 1) become more aware of our conscious embodied existence here and now in a nonjudgmental way, 2) enable us to regulate our thoughts, emotions, and behavior so they enhance and do not undermine our well-being and happiness, and 3) arouse our awareness and compassion for the suffering and needs of others.

Most neuroscientists and proponents of mindfulness exercises attribute the inspiration for their approach to one of two sources: the ancient eastern meditation traditions, especially Buddhism, and a growing contemporary trend in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience that focuses on the mind-body interface and the power of mindfulness to affect our bodies and our behavior. Yet most of the ethics we teach and discuss in colleges and universities is not drawn from the eastern traditions or from contemporary trends in the psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience but from modern western philosophies and their deontological, utilitarian, and rights-based ethical theories. Thus there is a disconnection between mindfulness practices and western ethics, or so it seems.

Yet mindfulness practices once played a significant role in the western ethical tradition. Unfortunately this role has been almost totally forgotten but perhaps now that mindfulness practices are growing on campuses it is time to recall it. The inclusion of mindfulness practices in ancient ethics is of more than historical interest because restoring mindfulness practices in western ethics can provide an important opportunity to enhance ethics across the curriculum.

Michael DeWilde
Grand Valley State University
Friday, October 4, 2:45pm (Weyerhauser)

What Actually Changes People (so that they are more like us …)?
Where there are not doubts that anything like “character” truly exists, there are still doubts that it can be changed, developed, or improved, especially after a certain age. For the past fourteen years, along with my teaching, I have been employed as an executive coach, a leadership mentor, and a values consultant to businesses of various sizes in my region of the country. The task, essentially, is to change, even if ever so incrementally, those managers and professionals with whom I work, so that they might better fit an ideal the employer has in mind. The ideal almost always has to do with developing greater capacities for characteristics like compassion, self-awareness, humility and empathy.
In this paper I reflect on how, with the use of recent scholarship in fields such as neuro-ethics, moral and positive psychology, and evolutionary biology I go about my work, what results I typically get, and what it is that in the end actually seems to change some people. In addition, I will spend some time reflecting on what it means to be employed as a change agent, to be the putative exemplar of what it is people are supposed to change into, and the obligations, if any, ethics professors have to be “of good character” themselves.

Ralph Didlake
University of Mississippi Medical Center
Friday, October 4, 9:00am (Wells Fargo)

An Engagement of Conscience Model for Dual Professional Roles
The inherently different objectives of distinct professional groups mapped onto the agency of a single person will generate conflicts of professional conscience. Graphical representation of key norms for a profession-wide construct of conscience may provide a useful, initial approach for examining how overlapping constructs influence decision-making for individuals who function within multiple professional domains. These individuals represent a growing sector of the workforce owing to the impact of inter-disciplinary training and trans-professional collaborations.

It is possible to represent normative “engagements of conscience” within each distinct professional constituency via the graphical representation of a gently rising and falling bell curve. At the midline of the curve and for a considerable area on either side are represented norms that generate the greatest sense of professional cohesion, and thus the least objection of conscience, among individual practitioners. Outliers on either side, however, can be conceptualized as representing objections to a stated norm, on the one side, and advocacy for inclusion of a new norm, on the other.

For one long-established group, medical educators, such a representation may be particularly instructive. Medical faculty must assess, as teachers, opportunities that support the acquisition of difficult and risky skills among the coming decade’s physician workforce. They must also assess, as responsible physicians, the risks and benefits attending a specific approach to care for a particular patient at a specific medical juncture. By graphically overlapping normative representations of “engagement of conscience” associated with the respective professional identities and responsibilities for physicians and for teaching faculty, it may be possible to better define the complex interplay of roles associated with multiple professional identities and the differing types of agency they represent. Such visualization permits us to more explicitly examine the expectations these often disparate and sometimes conflicting roles entail, and to develop resources for managing the inevitable conflicts of responsibility for the community good and for the individual good that arise.

Graphical representation of the normative professional standards also permits close examination of thresholds for objection to and advocacy for established norms. By mapping professional expectations for medical faculty, including the multiple contexts of treatment and training standards, and concomitant objections and advocacy, it may be possible to anticipate and address areas particularly provocative of individual conscience-in-conflict arising from discrepant norms associated with multiple professional identities.

Robert Doyle
California State University, Northridge
Friday, October 4, 2:45pm (Agricultural Science)

Pandemic Preparedness:
Using Ethics to Preserve the Character and Culture of the Community in an Emergency
Pandemics and other disasters turn our usual way of thinking and making ethical decisions on their head. Because of this, it is critical to have policies and procedures in place ahead of time. Once a pandemic hits, it is too late to
alter embedded practices, policies and protocols. As such, the importance of ethics to pandemic planning is in the “the application of value judgments to science,” especially as they are embedded in planning assumptions and within the practice of medicine itself.

One of the most challenging things about responding to pandemics is the need to shift emphasis in the values that guide decision-making while still preserving the character and culture of the community. Ethics can be helpful in this regard. This presentation will explore the use of ethical frameworks to guide decision-making to mitigate some of the unintended and unavoidable collateral damage from pandemics. The incorporation of ethics into pandemic plans can help to make these plans “instruments for building mutual trust and solidarity at such time that will likely present a major challenge to our societies.”

Ethical frameworks for pandemic preparedness will also encourage us to consider fair decision-making processes and equity in distribution of resources. This includes a shift towards a common good in order to avoid a utilitarian approach which may “run over” the disadvantaged. An ethical framework ought to help navigate the concept of the individual … the dignity of the individual and individual rights and, ultimately, may alert us to the necessity to override some individual rights, but also highlight the need to show respect and when there is a need to override individual rights we do so equitably. Paramount to this argument is the fact that the disadvantaged in normal times should not bear the burdens during pandemics.

This presentation will illustrate specific guiding values during a pandemic: First, it is generally accepted criteria to justify compulsory public health interventions (for example: quarantine/isolation). Second, intervention must be necessary and effective. Third, intervention should be least restrictive alternative to effectively respond to threat. Fourth, intervention should be procedural and take into account due process; Fifth, there should be a right of appeal. Sixth, benefits and burdens of intervention should be fairly distributed. Lastly, there should be transparency. Lastly, this presentation will outline specific ethical principles to help navigate these criteria. These may include principles such as Containment, Professional Responsibilities and Reciprocity, Rationing, and a Preferential Option for the Poor.

Karin Ellison, Arizona State University
Heather Canary, University of Utah
Joseph Herkert, Arizona State University
Jason Robert, Arizona State University
Friday, October 5, 10:45am (Wells Fargo)

Engaging Graduate Students and Faculty in Ethics Across the Curriculum

This panel will present three projects with ethics across the curriculum components that were developed at a large state university with a diverse community of faculty and students in collaboration with other institutional partners. The first two presentations will detail efforts on projects sponsored by the National Science Foundation’s Ethics Education in Science and Engineering (EESE) Program. The third presentation will describe the history and results to date of a faculty development program on teaching ethics across the curriculum that is funded and conducted by the university’s ethics center. The panel will include ample opportunity for moderated discussion among panelists and audience members about these efforts, focusing on the goals of promoting ethical inquiry and teaching ethics across the curriculum both in formal and informal educational settings.

The first presentation will cover a project in which an interdisciplinary team of scholars from two universities developed and assessed social responsibility materials for the Collaborative Institution Training Initiative (CITI) Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) online courses. Students, postdoctoral fellows, and faculty researchers from a wide range of disciplines will view the social responsibility materials. They will be incorporated in at least three CITI RCR courses—biomedical sciences, physical sciences, and social and behavioral sciences. This presentation provides an overview of materials developed and results of the two-wave assessment of outcomes. The main materials explain researchers’ social responsibilities as obligations to act in the public’s interests, sources of the
obligations, and ways researchers can act on social responsibilities. Eight supplementary cases and four short essays further explore issues. Assessment included a survey that measured ethical sensitivity and knowledge of ethical norms and standards corresponding to two topics in the courses: social responsibility of researchers and “Data Acquisition, Management, Sharing, and Ownership.” Assessment compared three groups: (1) Group 1 viewed a CITI RCR course that included materials on social responsibilities; (2) Group 2 took a CITI RCR course without social responsibility materials; (3) the Control Group did not have any RCR training immediately prior to assessment participation. Groups 1 and 2 completed the assessment survey immediately following taking a CITI course. The Control Group completed the survey at the beginning of the academic year. To gauge retention, Groups 1 and 2 completed the assessment survey a second time four months after they completed a CITI RCR course. Results are discussed in light of implications for ethics across the curriculum and online learning contexts.

The second presentation focuses on ethical and societal issues in energy research and development by detailing the methods and results of two efforts conducted as part of an EESE project in collaboration with the National Academy of Engineering. One effort was to host two one-day workshops for graduate students on ethical and social issues related to energy production and use. The workshops were designed for a group of energy research centers. Each workshop, one on biofuels and one on solar energy, focused on the specific area of energy research relevant to the students in the participating centers. The workshops included formal lectures, small group discussions, and roleplaying exercises. The second effort was a week-long National Institute on Energy, Ethics and Society that brought together doctoral students in engineering, natural sciences, and social sciences from several universities who are engaged in energy research with leading scholars and educators in the fields of applied ethics and energy policy. Topics addressed included biofuels, hydraulic fracturing (fracking), climate change, nuclear power, solar energy, utility regulation, and the emerging “smart grid.” Institute activities included formal lectures, small group discussions, roleplaying exercises, field trips to energy research facilities, and individual mentoring of students. In addition, each student designed and presented at the Institute an educational activity on energy ethics that they would conduct at their home institution upon their return.

The third presentation will focus on a Teaching Ethics Fellows program, which was initiated almost a decade ago. The program was initially designed to share resources and techniques for teaching applied ethics from the ethics center to participants across the campus. Almost every year, the program has changed tenor, tone, and focus, largely because responsibility for the program has rotated through a variety of applied ethics scholars. Accordingly, the data we have collected are both sparse and diverse. And yet there remain important lessons to be learned from these efforts. This presentation explores the different formulations of the course, the demographics of the fellows (professors at various levels across the University), the “teaching the teachers” materials employed, the various outcomes achieved (both intended and unintended), the challenges to scaling up the program, and the conditions correlated with and potentially responsible for its successes and failures along the way.

Landon Frim
St. Joseph’s College, New York
Friday, October 4, 9:00am (Agricultural Science)

Does Charity Begin at Home?

In the new forward to his influential book, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress, applied ethicist Peter Singer argues that concern for the welfare of others began with a genetically-based drive to protect one’s own kin, but has steadily expanded ever since. It is through our faculty of reason, specifically, that we can and do expand our concern ever outward – to the poor, to the foreigner, and even to nonhuman animals. For reason discovers in our original biological imperatives universal principles which, as it were, take on a life of their own.

Not all readers of Singer perhaps realize that this notion of an expanding circle of consciousness/ethics is first fully articulated in late Stoic philosophy – particularly that of Hierocles and Seneca. The Stoic conception of “Oikeiosis,” of increased familiarization and identification with the other, has marked practical philosophy ever since.
On the one hand, the conception of ever-expanding circles of moral consciousness is admirable in its universalism. Moral progress is equated with expanding beyond narrow parochialisms and prejudices. However, the notion of Oikeiosis also might suggest that, in order to reach the rarified heights of moral universalism, we must first pass through a sincere concern for those closest to us. So, in order to care about the suffering in Darfur, I must first be concerned with my own family, and the suffering of the poor of the Western world.

This paper will ask two questions: First, does the principle of Oikeiosis indeed imply that we must first care for those closest to us (physically, biologically, culturally, etc.)? Secondly, what are the practical implications for our social priorities? Specifically, what does the principle of Oikeiosis (should we affirm it) imply about how we should think about foreign aid, humanitarian relief, and personal questions of charity and consumption?

In short, this paper will interrogate whether, as the old maxim states, “Charity begins at home.”

William Frey  
University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez  
Saturday, October 5, 10:30am (Wells Fargo)

Teaching Responsibility: Pedagogical Strategies for Eliciting a Sense of Moral Obligation
This paper will outline a pedagogical approach to teaching moral responsibility by unpacking this concept, following Herbert Fingarette, as moral responsiveness to essential moral relevance (Fingarette 1971). As response to relevance, moral responsibility begins with sensitivity to the moral aspects of the surrounding situation and unfolds with the development and execution of skillful action to transform surroundings in light of this moral relevance.

Developing moral responsibility poses a series of pedagogical challenges that arise out of its cognitive and volitional skills, the first detailing how the agent hones in on moral relevance, the second how the agent responds through action to this relevance. These challenges overlap substantially with the widely known skill sets laid out by the Hastings Center.

Teaching modules published in an ethics across the curriculum toolkit will show how responsibility can be learned by redeploying existing pedagogical practices such as case discussion, role-playing, dramatization, and framework-aided practice sessions in problem solving. These familiar classroom practices can be used to support a skills-based pedagogical approach that directly addresses the unique challenges presented by the practice of moral responsibility. In summary, this essay outlines a proactive approach to moral responsibility, describes the pedagogical challenges it poses, and offers specific and concrete classroom responses to these challenges.

Jeramy Gee  
University of Washington, Seattle  
Thursday, October 3, 11:15am (Wells Fargo)

Let Your Conscience Be Your Guide? Remarks on the Authority of Conscience
There is little doubt that the dictates of conscience are felt to have authority whether we act in accord with them or not. Thus we are pained by conscience with feelings of guilt or of shame, we may be moved by conscience to act against a powerful inclination or interest, and we sometimes take the voice of conscience so seriously that we refuse to comply with direct legal and administrative injunctions, or the moral principles of the majority. However, there is a tendency in modern discussions of conscience to make it out to be little more than either dutifulness or a subjective moral sense with no objective ground, or to discuss it only obliquely through conscientiousness non-compliance within the context of political theory without explaining what it is or of what its authority consists. Opposed to this thin conception of conscience stands Bishop Joseph Butler’s older and more robust vision of
To get a clearer notion of what a robust conception of conscience would be, addressing Elizabeth Anscombe’s scathing remark that Butler “exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man’s conscience may tell him to do the vilest things” is worth consideration. This criticism may be developed through a slightly out-of-context use of Jonathan Bennett’s much cited discussion of the conscientious judgments of such characters as Heinrich Himmler and the fictional Huckleberry Finn. In Himmler’s case acting from conscience does lead to the vilest things. In Finn’s case acting contrary to conscience appears to be to his moral credit. So, one might complain that conscience has no authority and no worth independent of the veracity of the moral principles it tracks. So, a robust conception of conscience must either tie in necessarily to right principles, show that it has authority over the self independently of its getting things right, or both. I argue that conscience has authority and value independent of whether it is in error.

In the next section I develop Anscombe’s challenge to the authority of conscience through Bennett’s discussion of Heinrich Himmler and Huckleberry Finn. In section three I address the worry that conscience lacks authority in virtue of its dubious content. In section four I argue that even if we grant that conscience is corruptible, it must still be thought to have special purchase in the moral decisions of the agent because it acts as the faculty by which we distinguish moral reasons from other motives and inclinations. So, my argument distinguishes between ‘authority’ as tracking right principles, and ‘authority’ as judging a moral reason to act.

Dean Gueras  
Texas State University  
Friday, October 4, 2:45pm (Wells Fargo)

Applying the Unified Ethic
The aim of this paper is to explain the Unified Ethic (UE) and show how it can be applied in the classroom. UE is based upon the assumption that the major ethical theories form a unified whole rather than a set of contrasting perspectives. According to UE, theories classified as teleological, deontological, virtue-based, and intuition-based are related as in a Wittgensteinian family resemblance or network. The various ethical theories express different aspects of a comprehensive ethic rather than fundamentally opposed ethical frameworks. In analyzing ethical issues through UE, one examines the ways in which the seemingly different ethical theories coincide rather than the ways in which the conflict.

There are several advantages to using UE in the classroom. First, analysis through UE exposes the student to the entire range of ethical thought in the examination of specific ethical issues. Secondly, the varied aspects of ethics included in UE appeal to the diverse ethical attitudes, and perspectives that constitute the differing “ethical styles,” as defined by Robert Solomon, of students. In addition, by including intuitionism within the unity, UE provides a role for conscience while protecting it from dissolving into subjectivity.

Cliff Guthrie  
Husson University  
Thursday, October 3, 11:15am (Agricultural Science)

Employing Conscience Online: From Hactivism to Opting Out
Recent revelations that the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) has been collecting metadata on ordinary American phone calls and Internet use has stirred more awareness of the electronically surveilled culture in which we live. Given the ubiquity of security cameras, traceable mobile devices, and Internet behavioral advertising, what options are available for those who wish to defend their privacy or subvert surveillance programs? This paper will explore an array of strategies employed by those who resist, commenting on their ethical defensibility and effectiveness.
At one end of the spectrum are high-profile leakers with classified access, like Edward Snowden, and sophisticated “hacktivists” like the Anonymous group, who work to subvert surveillance programs and the powers that employ them. They often use civil disobedience rhetoric to justify leaks of classified programs and cyber-attacks on corporations and institutions against whom they have political objections. At the other end of the spectrum are ordinary citizens who may object to surveillance and but are unsure what opt-out options they have. In between are less well-known trends in Internet vigilantism and electronic civil disobedience directed against surveillance activities of corporations or law authorities, or turning them back on the authorities themselves. The growth of these strategies suggests that morally motivated activism and conscientious objection are evolving along with the sophistication and ubiquity of tracking technologies. What place is there, then, for conscience in a surveilled and online world?

Jared Hibbard-Swanson
Willamette University
Thursday, October 3, 1:30pm (Weyerhauser)

Ethical Mentorship in the Academy:
Ancient Traditions and Modern Possibilities
The idea of mentorship is not a foreign concept within the modern academy, for several of the core relationships within higher education are organized on the model of an experienced mentor guiding or imparting knowledge to the novice mentee. Whether we consider the relation between professor and student, tutor and tutee, or dormitory counselors and residents, it is often the personal bonds of trust and mutual concern that develop between individuals at different phases of intellectual or social growth that the university relies upon to advance academic achievement, student retention, and degree completion.

Despite this institutional familiarity with the mentoring relation, however, there is at least one powerful dimension of mentorship that has largely been neglected—even intentionally excluded—within its modern academic deployment: the potential for co-supportive development of ethical character between mentor and mentee. I argue in this paper that ethical development was an essential element of the classical conception of mentorship in the ancient world and that the neglect of this dynamic in modern settings has allowed the academy to surrender a portion of its ethical and social mission to pecuniary interests. Drawing on the analyses of ancient ethical mentorship executed by Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, I explore the potential for mentoring relationships to serve as avenues of character development, refining the character of both mentor and mentee by encouraging them to attend to emergent ethical problems provoked within their inquiries.

Despite pluralistic concerns over ethical or political neutrality in academic relationships, I argue that promoting increased avenues of ethical reflection and conversation between mentors and mentees is a powerful mechanism for restoring the relevance of academic work to the social interests of the broader community. My paper concludes by detailing some of my own experiences utilizing service-learning projects as a means for promoting increased ethical dialogue across academic relationships, revealing both the risks and the opportunities contained within the concept of ethical mentorship.

Azalea M. Hulbert
Samford University
Saturday, October 5, 10:30am (Agricultural Science)

Better World Theatre:
A Multidisciplinary Approach
Better World Theatre is a unique arts-based ethics pedagogy introduced at my institution in 2011. It was designed as a collaboration between the university ethics center and the department of theatre, to be implemented in the context of a course and in partnership with another academic department. As a course-based project, it has proven exceptionally effective at engaging students and faculty from a given discipline in ethical issues specific to that
field. It also effectively brings students together in a co-curricular context to focus on broader, less discipline-specific topics (i.e. academic integrity).

As an arts-based approach to ethics education, Better World Theatre effectively and creatively provides students the opportunity to 1) identify and explore real-life ethical issues; 2) practice ethical deliberation and engage in structured and intentional moral discourse; and 3) develop and strengthen their own ethical values through the lens of professional identity. This pedagogy will be of interest to both faculty and non-academic staff, as it can be effectively applied in either a course-based or co-curricular context.

As there is to date no formal data on the effect of this particular pedagogy at my institution, the presentation will focus on the anecdotal evidence that points to increased moral reasoning capacity in previous student participants, as well as on evidence in existing literature on the topic. The presentation will also examine the pedagogical structure, as well as variables that may impact its effectiveness, including the maturity of student participants, their field of study, and the method of delivery (i.e. curricular or co-curricular). Lastly, the presentation will explore future possibilities for enhancing the pedagogy and its impact across the curriculum.

Amy Ihlan  
St. Catherine University  
Thursday, October 3, 11:15am (Weyerhauser)

Conscience and Character in Leadership Ethics

Leadership is a growing field of interdisciplinary study. Leadership courses and programs at both undergraduate and graduate levels are now part of the curriculum at many colleges and universities. Leadership ethics (whether framed as “ethical leadership”, the “ethics of leadership”, or “ethics and leadership”) is emerging as an important subject in both leadership theory and practice.

This paper analyzes the roles that concepts of conscience and character play under various theories of leadership, with primary focus on theories of “transformational,” “authentic,” and “servant” leadership. References and appeals to conscience and character in interdisciplinary leadership literature often do not fully explore or explain either the concepts themselves, or their implications for moral thinking and judgment. Connecting leadership theories to ethical theories, this analysis suggests ways to provide more substantial philosophical and normative foundations for the concepts of conscience and character in a leadership context.

This paper also considers some practical pedagogical strategies for teachers of leadership ethics. The concepts of conscience and character have intuitive resonance for many students, and are thus useful starting points for students to think critically about their own experiences. For example, assignments asking students to think about (write about, or discuss) a time when they followed (or did not follow) their conscience – or about what character traits “good” leader should have -- may help students begin to understand these ethical concepts in concrete experiential contexts. Conscience and character can also serve as heuristic devices for leadership practice: the prickling of conscience may signal moral issues requiring judgment and action, and developing the virtuous habits of a good leader may help leaders to actually become more ethical, or at least more sensitive to moral concerns. Reflecting on the concepts of conscience and character introduces students to ethical theory, and reflection on leadership practices grounded on conscience or character encourages thinking about theories and styles of (ethical) leadership. Conscience and character thus have great potential as pedagogical bridges between the theory and practice of leadership ethics.
Ethics Training for Atlanta Public Schools

In 2012, the Atlanta Public School (APS) system undertook a project with Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Institute for Leadership, Ethics, and Character to provide both on-line and in-person ethics training for APS employees.

The on-line trainings, designed by the staff at the Institute, reviewed by Education Department faculty, and evaluated by the Burruss Institute at KSU, provided an overview of ethical concerns related to the educational environment. All employees of the Atlanta Public School system were required to take one of the on-line trainings and pass the subsequent quiz. There were two levels of on-line training provided: one 2-hour long version that all employees who were going to serve as Ethics Advocates were required to take and one 20-minute version that all other employees were required to take. Topics covered in the on-line training included an introduction to ethics, the four basic values of ethics, information on creating an ethical culture, and a listing of available resources. The on-line training was available both as a written and a recorded version.

Eleven Ethics Advocate workshops were conducted by the staff at the Institute and were offered at the Instructional Services Center in Atlanta. Each school in the APS system selected two Ethics Advocates to represent them in these workshops. The workshops were each 4-hours long. The Advocate left the workshops with binders of materials, posters, movies, and a book to assist them in then conducting at least two workshops in their own schools. The Institute is recognized in the State of Georgia to provide PLU credits for teachers. Each teacher who took part in the workshop, completed the 2-hour on-line training, and then redelivered four hours of training in their respective schools was eligible for one PLU.

Moral Hesitance:
Deriving an Obligation from the Skepticism of Famous Modern Philosophers

Thomas Reid is famous for rejecting the common theory of ideas held by David Hume at least in part because of its skeptical ramifications. Although the rejection of the common theory of ideas may allow for reasonable certainty regarding many everyday perceptions, Reid does not claim to solve many of the deep skeptical worries at the heart of Hume’s philosophy. In particular, Reid is hesitant to claim knowledge of the ultimate operations, i.e., the “hows,” of moral thinking in adequately rational moral agents. While I agree with Reid that it is unnecessary to solve these deep skeptical worries in order to give an account of morality’s objectivity, I hold contra-Reid (and contra-Hume) that it is the persistence of these very skeptical worries that accounts for an appropriately broad-scoped moral community.

Interactive Case Studies:
Making Ethics Cases Come Alive with Active Learning

This article explains a “best practices” classroom exercise using a modification of a traditional case study. Case studies have been used effectively in classroom teaching for years. They provide real stories of organizations with real ethical issues allowing students to learn by applying theories and knowledge from the classroom to the case
study. The exercise is different and unique from a traditional case study in that it integrates several other teaching methods and expands on the idea of “active learning” as follows: First, it is original in that it is developed and written about a local organization and yet follows the format of a textbook case study in quality and content. Second, the researcher and author (the class professor) of the case study is involved in the analysis and discussion with the students. Third, it integrates a corporate visit into the case study so students see the organization in action. Fourth, it concludes with a special evening seminar where the CEO of the organization presents his or her ethical philosophy in managing the company that allows for a question and answer session with the key leader in the case. A new case is developed each semester and presently is on its sixth case study.

The exercise is part of a recently developed entry level ethics and moral leadership class required of all students in a school of business (approximately 70 students are enrolled each semester). In addition to the ethics class, the new curriculum of the school of business integrates ethics into the curriculum in into the curriculum in many different ways (i.e. embedding ethics into all courses, integrating ethics and leadership into the school of business major objectives, scheduled ethics speakers in the semester). The ethics course (where the exercise is presented) is taught from a management perspective. Students are presented with a management systems framework early in the course emphasizing the importance of the organization in influencing ethical behavior in terms of leadership, strategy, culture, procedures, and structure. In analyzing organizations students understand how each of these five elements can provide a powerful influence on the ethical behavior of the employees and the company, and how they are interrelated to each other.

The article explains the five stages in developing the exercise. These include: developing the written case study, introducing the analytical management framework in class, discussion of the case study in class, the corporate tour, the evening ethics seminar with the CEO, and the final discussion and assessment. The assessment of the exercise consists of an exam related to the student’s knowledge and ability to apply the analytical model to case studies, and a written reflection paper handed in by the students at the end of the exercise.

Charles J. List
SUNY-Plattsburgh
Thursday, October 3, 1:30pm (Agricultural Science)

Building an Ecological Conscience

Finding ways to inculcate an ecological conscience is a project first explored by Aldo Leopold. He was searching for ways to move us beyond mere economic self-interest in making decisions about the land. As he says “No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions.” If this internal change is the development of a virtue, as I believe, and if virtues are habitual ways of responding to events in the world, then a necessary and rarely explored step in building such a virtue is to discover those kinds of events in the world to which an ecological conscience will respond with appropriate actions.

I argue that there are three general kinds of events in biotic communities which are salient for an ecological conscience. These natural events or signs occur regardless of our abilities or interests in recognizing them, so a central part of educating for an ecological conscience requires that we find ways to develop sensitivities for them.

My paper will proceed as follows. First, I will make the distinctions among the three kinds of events and also discuss some limitations. Second, I will contrast a standard model of the ecological conscience with a richer version, one that is built to include other modes of saliency. Finally, I will make some suggestions regarding the problems of educating for the development of an ecological conscience across the college curriculum.
Caroline R. Lundquist  
Lane Community College  
Friday, October 4, 1:00pm (Agricultural Science)

On Kindness Where Least Expected: 
Kindness in the Ethical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant is hardly the first philosopher to come to mind when one reflects on the value of kindness, unless, of course, he does so as the embodiment of resistance to such reflection. Even in his earliest writings and lectures on ethics, where he appears most to be influenced by moral sentimentalists like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, Kant already places considerable restrictions on the role of human feeling in the moral life, and on the kinds of virtue to be commended. The development of his moral thinking manifests an increasingly vehement rejection of feeling as a ground for human goodness, and a diminishing esteem for moral virtue. In his later ethical works the sentiments and virtues play at best a supporting role in the moral life, and this only insofar as they are in some way subsumed under Reason.

Surprisingly, Kant’s resistance to kindness is quite equivocal, as is evinced by his characterization of moral friendship and in particular by his prescriptions regarding friendly truth-telling. His reasons for appreciating gestures of kindness are at least as philosophically rich and intuitively appealing as his reasons for denigrating them. He not only recognizes the value of kindness, but indeed sees kindness— as actualized within moral friendship— as an indispensable component of a moral life worth living. This valuing of kindness is most certainly at odds with the image we have inherited of Kant. But then, one often finds kindness where least expected.

In this paper I refine a commonsense characterization of kindness by engaging Kant’s analyses of kindness-related phenomena. I begin by exploring Kant’s suspicions regarding the value of moral sentiments and virtues, placing a special emphasis on his gendered division of moral virtue in Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Next, I turn to Kant’s account of moral friendship, and especially to tension between revealing and concealing truth that he expects friends to navigate, and that I interpret as a prescription for kindness between friends. I then work to build a tension between Kant’s prescribing of duties of kindness and his apparent preference for non-intervention in others’ affairs, highlighting the resistance to kindness that we as individuals so often experience. I end by asking to what extent certain elements of Kant’s morality might bolster a rich and useful conceptualization of kindness.

David K. McGraw  
Mark Christian Piper  
James Madison University  
Friday, October 4, 1:00pm (Wells Fargo)

The Madison Collaborative:  
Ethical Reasoning in Action

“The Madison Collaborative: Ethical Reasoning in Action” is an effort at James Madison University to teach ethical reasoning across the curriculum in the classroom, as well as through co-curricular programs. Originally created to fulfill the “Quality Enhancement Plan” requirement of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, the Madison Collaborative has already begun to transform teaching and student success programs at JMU.

The goals of the Madison Collaborative mesh well with the mission and culture of James Madison University. JMU’s mission states that “We are a community committed to preparing students to be educated and enlightened citizens who lead productive and meaningful lives.” JMU has long had a culture that emphasizes civil discourse, citizenship, and engagement. The Madison Collaborative’s emphasis on ethical reasoning builds on and enhances these traditions.
At the heart of the Madison Collaborative’s approach to teaching ethical reasoning is a framework of Eight Key Questions (or “8KQs”), to be used by students when evaluating an ethical situation. While these 8KQs have been informed by centuries of philosophical thought on ethical reasoning, they are designed to draw in students at the introductory level and encourage them to get started by asking the right questions.

The Eight Key Questions are:

- **Outcomes** – What are the short-term and long-term outcomes of possible actions?
- **Fairness** – How can I act equitably and balance all interests?
- **Authority** – What do legitimate authorities (e.g., experts, law, my god[s]) expect of me?
- **Liberty** – What principles of freedom and personal autonomy apply?
- **Rights** – What rights (e.g., innate, legal, social) apply?
- **Responsibilities** – What duties and obligations apply?
- **Empathy** – How would I respond if I cared deeply about those involved?
- **Character** – What actions will help me become my ideal self?

During the 2012-2013 year, many necessary foundational activities took place, such as the hiring of a Chair for the Madison Collaborative, the piloting of the 8KQs by several faculty members in a number of courses in several different academic programs, the facilitation of workshops to introduce ethical reasoning generally and the 8KQs specifically to hundreds of student affairs professionals and general education faculty, and the designing of ethical reasoning activities for incoming first-year students during orientation week.

As the Madison Collaborative gets up and running in a more formal sense in the 2013-14 year, it faces many challenges, including developing and maintaining a first-year ethical reasoning experience, and implementing ethical reasoning in general education courses and upper-division courses as well. This will require establishing and maintaining communication with a critical mass of faculty who have the interest and ability to make the Madison Collaborative a truly university-wide experience.

In this proposal, the presenters seek to share our experiences in helping to create the Madison Collaborative, but more importantly, we seek to engage in a dialogue with others who have expertise in designing and implementing ethics across the curriculum programs at other universities.

**Monica Mueller**
**Capital University**
**Friday, October 4, 1:00pm (Weyerhauser)**

**Befriending Oneself:**
**Conscience as an Effect of the Discourse on Thought**

Hannah Arendt identifies conscience as an effect of one’s discourse in thinking. She derives this conception from the Socratic admonition to always be in harmony with oneself. This reading leads Arendt to identify the voice of conscience as the “other” in consciousness, who awaits one when one returns home, i.e. when one is alone.

Accordingly, this paper asks what it means to befriend oneself in thinking. This understanding of the voice of conscience poses at least three problems: a conceptual problem, a phenomenological problem, and a problem for judgment. Because of the possible pitfalls of ignorance, prejudice, and self-deception, an awareness of one’s thinking is required for the activation of conscience. Furthermore, the narrative dimension of thinking that Arendt identifies as preparing one’s experience for judgment is plagued with the potential for error in perceiving ethical realities. For Arendt, preparing the narrative depends on one’s inter-subjective experience because it is exposure to judgments of others that influences one’s ability to make sense of one’s own experience. Conscience poses a
phenomenological problem for thinking and judgment because of its temporality—one experiences the effect of conscience after already committing a guilt inspiring offense. Conscience, insofar as it is an effect of thinking arising in consciousness, concerns thinking about past deeds. This is problematic because to be effective, conscientiousness must impede bad action on future occasions. Fortunately we are not static beings, yet discourse with oneself must persist in order to influence future judgment. Last, but not least, conscience poses a problem for judgment because one must be reflectively reflexive when judging.

The commands of rational necessity as isolated in determinant judgment, as in rule following or syllogistic reasoning, are insufficient for guidance of ethical action. Instead one must consult alternate perspectives and subject possible courses of action to reflective judgment in order to choose well. While David Velleman, for example, refers to this as the echo of common knowledge, common knowledge itself may be deficient in ethical guidance because of blindness or corruption. As such, I explore the extent to which being a friend to oneself in the conversation of conscience requires extensive discourse, patience, and a willingness to endure unknown terrain, occasionally without guidance.

Kristin Parvizian
University of Illinois-Chicago
Saturday, October 5, 10:30am

Character and Moral Deliberation
In his book Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior, John Doris makes a provocative claim about the status of the traditional theories of moral deliberation. Following situationist psychological experiments including the famous Milgram and Stanford Prison experiments, Doris argues that the concept of character is bankrupt. He argues that the evidence from the studies shows that characterological descriptions neither represent past patterns of moral behavior nor accurately predict future behaviors, two functions that would be necessary for any theory of moral deliberation to explain actual moral behavior and regulate future behavior. As such, all the traditional theories amount to little more than wasted effort; appealing to character will not help moral agents understand why they fail nor will it help them act better in the future.

As an alternative, Doris proposes a new moral theory, situationism, which does away with problematic characterological concepts in favor of the evidence provided by psychological experiments. By and large, the situationist studies demonstrate the immense impact that small features of a situation can have on moral behavior. Doris’ theory requires that moral agents study both psychological experiments and their own past behaviors to find such features that negatively affect their behavior, look for the same features in the future, and adjust their behavior accordingly.

In the wake of Doris’ arguments, much has been said in defense of character, particularly by virtue ethicists. Little has been said, however, in response to Doris’ positive views. My project focuses specifically on Doris’ positive theory, its shortcomings, and the status of character for moral deliberation. The idea of “situational feature” that Doris adopts from situationist moral psychology is highly problematic and cannot provide a functioning theory of moral deliberation. I will show that the kind of situational features Doris has in mind are small and volatile enough to make moral deliberation (and in particular moral education) impossible, at least for humans.

Further, my contention is that the failure of Doris’ theory is not accidental; that is, his situationist ethics does not merely require minor theoretical adjustments to become a workable theory. The failure of situationist ethics to provide an adequate theory of moral deliberation comes directly from the rejection of any and all characterological concepts. Character—in the broadest sense, at least—is an essential component of any moral theory, because moral deliberation requires stability of the relevant moral concepts over time and across context. As I strive to become a better moral agent, I need to be able to reflect upon my past moral behaviors and reasoning and be confident that my self-evaluations will hold for my future self as well. Character is precisely the device that allows moral theories to have such stability; by appealing to broad generalizations about behavior and personality that change gradually and predictably (if they change at all), a moral agent can be assured that her evaluations will be
useful to her future self as well. By discarding all characterological concepts, Doris has shifted all focus away from the moral agent in favor of context. Context, of course, is wildly unstable; there is no guarantee—and only a small likelihood—that the situations a moral agent will encounter in the future will be like the situations she has encountered in the past. Doris’ theory lacks the stability needed for good moral deliberation, precisely because he has given up on character. Situationism has failed beyond possible repair because character is not only useful, but necessary for moral deliberation.

Marlann Patterson
University of Wisconsin-Stout
Thursday, October 3, 1:30pm (Wells Fargo)

Methods for Teaching Ethical Deliberation to Science Majors
A course called “Issues for the Science Professional” offers students an opportunity to develop a scientific and ethical conscience. I led a class of thirty science majors through semester projects of their groups’ choice. Their projects required students to take a stance on a relevant issue and critically explain their reasoning. As evidenced by the students’ project progression during the semester, the course gave them an increased ability to address ethical issues in their discipline. The student projects culminated in a local research poster presentation.

In this session, I will highlight the students’ projects and discuss the evolution of their moral consciences during the project. I will also discuss how the course was structured, how I taught decision-making, give some textbook recommendations, and suggest ways in which the course can meet general education objectives. This session will be of use to both science and non-science instructors who wish to learn about a project-based approach to teaching moral development. After attending the session, attendees should have project ideas that scale to a single semester, assessment methods for moral development during project work, and some concrete suggestions for implementation in your classroom.

Kimberly Peer
Kent State University
Thursday, October 3, 1:30pm (Weyerhauser)

Developing Character through Ethical Deliberation:
The “Five Minds for the Future” Perspective
Professional education programs throughout the country focus on the development of a strong moral compass. Anchored in theory and guided by virtues, professional education programs typically provide ethical decision making models without building the foundation for consideration. Although models are useful in ethical decision-making, understanding why one chooses the options to resolve each dilemma is essential to establishing a strong character.

Gardner (2008) utilizes a model emphasizing the need to develop more than just the ethical mind to address the challenges facing our society. Gardner's model presents five minds that will help build a strong character – disciplined, synthesizing, creating, respectful and ethical. With educational programs focusing on interprofessional and inter-disciplinary integration, understanding how each of these minds plays a role in the development of a strong moral compass is important. The disciplined mind is content based and anchored in mastery of competencies. The synthesizing mind generates a mechanism by which the big picture is considered and information from one’s life and experiences are integrated into resolving a dilemma. The creating mind seeks to take chances to impact change despite the risks associated with “doing the right thing.” The respectful mind appreciates and acknowledges the need for harmony but recognizes the need for discomfort in the change process. Lastly, the ethical mind considers how one’s behaviors reflect the internalized personal and professional values.

Understanding and appreciating the tensions between the “minds” is essential to character development. Understanding and appreciating the harmonious relationships amongst each helps ethical decision-making processes. “In the future, the form of mind that is likely to be at greatest premium is the synthesizing mind. And so

The purpose of this session is to discuss Gardner’s model relative to character development in the ethical decision-process and provide concrete pedagogical applications/strategies for implementing this model in professional education programs. Specific consideration of the literature in character education in professional education will be central to the presentation. A model for integrating Gardner’s model across the curriculum will conclude the presentation.

Ruth Porritt
West Chester University
Thursday, October 3, 3:15pm (Agricultural Science)

Reconsidering Conscience
In his thought-provoking journal article “Conscience,” Larry May argues that “For conscience to affect us at all two conditions must be met: we have an interest in the future harmony of ourselves and we choose to reflect on what actions might disrupt that harmony” (60). He derives this position from Socrates and Hannah Arendt to ultimately show that although conscience as self-harmony might seem only egoistic and self-confirming, its self-interest “merges” with the interests of others (66). Yet a problem arises. Professor May asks: How can we explain the cases that involve people “who reflect on their lives and based on this decide to engage in self-destructive acts?” (63). Or “what about those who coolly and reflectively cause great harm to others”(63)? Prof. May is puzzled by these situations and says, “I must confess that it is difficult to imagine people so different from myself that they seek after disharmony rather than harmony or who achieve harmony by harming others, but in all honesty I can’t rule this out and I’m not sure what I would be able to say to such individuals” (63).

I will address this conundrum by offering a specific counter-example to Prof. May’s conscience as self-harmony thesis. If we look at this kind of conscience through the lens of psychological dissociation, a condition of trauma survivors who have not adequately integrated the trauma and its attendant emotions into their conscious awareness, we can see that conscience as self-harmony is not complex enough to identify people who are not necessarily merging their self-interests with the interests of others, although they may believe they are doing so. Their efforts to maintain their inner harmony can give them what I call an impaired conscience, a conscience that does not function to protect the moral agent from self-destructive and other-destructive decisions and actions.

My reconsideration of conscience in light of dissociation is important for two reasons: 1) It prompts us to be circumspect about our own assumptions that we have a conscience and behave conscientiously and 2) It suggests that our work in ethics classrooms needs to be compassionately attentive to the problems and implications of psychological dissociation, for it is finally a human condition we can all learn from and integrate into our own understandings of that we must undergo to try to live conscientiously.

We are facing classrooms that are composed of students with a variety of life experiences, some related to traumatic levels of violence. Some of our returning veterans, or students who have been in severe car accidents, may have post-traumatic stress disorder, a form of psychological dissociation. Other students have family members who have experienced traumatic losses, such as death due to terrorist attacks, or from incidents in military combat. Others may have a parent with an unspeakable form of traumatic experience, a situation that has impacted their households. So to bring the pain of trauma survivors safely into my classroom—protecting all students from any expectation that they speak about their traumatic experiences—we discuss Gregory Orr’s memoir The Blessing. The Orr family seems to be living the conventional “American Dream”: Greg’s father, Dr. Orr, a general practitioner, has a beautiful wife, five children, a remodeled stone manor house on a large property with barns and horses, a sail boat and a series of sports cars. Yet this family struggles in ways that engage our compassionate empathy. The memoir is written with expressive clarity and candor, which makes its complex contents accessible. Using The Blessing to understand this phenomenon more fully, I will describe an unimpaired, fully functioning conscience and then discuss how psychological dissociation can impair conscience.
Teaching the Ethics of Whistleblowing in the Post-Sandusky Era

Teaching the ethics of whistleblowing has become exceedingly complicated in the post-Sandusky era. Mike McQueary was admittedly an imperfect whistleblower. McQueary’s action to report Jerry Sandusky’s rape of a ten-year-old boy to the Penn State football team’s head coach, rather than to police authorities, was ineffective at ending the cycle of abuse. Organizational leaders, such as Graham Spanier and Joe Paterno, sought to protect the reputation of the institution by covering up Sandusky’s activities. Evidence also suggests that McQueary was successfully bribed with the offer of a promotion in return for his subsequent silence. According to Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett, McQueary “met the minimum obligation in reporting it up, but did not in my opinion meet a moral obligation that all of us would have.” With regard to McQueary’s involvement in the Sandusky scandal, the duty to be a conscientious whistleblower would seem not to have been met.

In teaching the ethics of whistleblowing, instructors typically teach that the best way to blow the whistle on illegal or unethical activity within an organization is to, first, report internally or up the chain of command (which McQueary did) and, second, if no action to rectify the situation is taken, report the activity externally, e.g. to police, regulatory agencies or the press (which McQueary failed to do). By meeting the first duty, many students believe that the whistleblower has satisfied not only their legal obligations, but also their ethical obligation, to report—as did McQueary. Their intuition is that the second obligation remains supererogatory, since a duty to remain loyal to one’s organization (exhibited, for instance, in the Northbound Train metaphors) cancels out any strict duty to report externally.

In institutional settings where the risk of child sexual abuse is great, mandated reporter requirements can bring the obligation to report externally within the bounds of an agent’s legal duty. However, in the absence of such a requirement or outside the domain of sexual abuse cases, most whistleblower protection laws only protect the reporter from retaliation, making it permissible (but not obligatory) to report, either internally or externally, and still retain one’s employment. McQueary is suspected of benefiting from Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Protection Law, even though, as Corbett reminds us, he was not a conscientious whistleblower. This paper addresses the problem of how to effectively teach the ethics of whistleblowing when students believe, contrary to Corbett, that someone like McQueary was the perfect whistleblower.

Ethical Constraints and Problem-Solving

Solving problems requires imagination subject to constraints: a poet in finding exactly the right phrase or rhyme is doing exactly what engineers are doing when they solve a design problem, historians when they figure out the whys and wherefores of past events, mechanics when they determine what is causing that odd noise from the right front end, and so on. One constraint on everyone’s list is moral: do not cause unnecessary harms. The kinds of harms differ, obviously. The harms a poet may inflict by choosing one word rather than another is very different from the kind of harms a mechanic may cause by putting in the wrong size bolt, for instance. But that minimal moral constraint is enough to make all problem-solving morally laden -- from mathematics to engineering to history to photography.

How we present what we have to say is itself a solution to a problem. Getting the presentation wrong can cause great harm, and so our presentations and representations have moral weight.
As our stalking horse for the thesis, we will look at Edward Tufte’s claim that the engineers at Morton Thiokol were morally responsible for the death of the seven Challenger astronauts because they failed to present their view in a perspicuous way. Had they done so, he says, no rational person would have agreed to a launch. He is wrong about the engineers’ presentation and wrong to judge them morally responsible for the astronauts’ deaths, but he is right to insist that the way we present what we propose is a skill. His presentation makes that point nicely: he failed to get the facts right and failed to represent what facts there were in a perspicuous way. Had he done so, he would not have made the moral judgment he made and not have committed the harm of accusing the engineers for the deaths of the astronauts.

Stephen Satris
Clemson University
Thursday, October 3, 3:15pm (Wells Fargo)

Cheating Across the Curriculum
The paper begins with a brief survey of what is known about the typical level of cheating at the college and university level. The anecdotes and stories we hear and read about are striking, but don’t tell us much about what is typical – which is my focus. A brief examination of the empirical data shows that there is a cheating problem and that it is serious. Secondly, we might then ask: what are we to do? Do we have a responsibility to address this cheating? Here, I answer in the affirmative, and my argument is based on our professional responsibility as teachers, as educators. It is part of our professional duty. So, the third part of the paper asks: what can we do?

Here, an examination of several responses to the cheating problem is conducted. It turns out that there is no silver bullet, no ideal solution that will solve everything, everywhere, but there are lessons to be learned. For example, a supposedly “tough” approach to the problem might rely on strict and serious punishment -- perhaps a “no tolerance” approach that results in expulsion from school upon the first offense. On this view, if any cheating continues, this only shows that the punishment is not severe enough, or perhaps that it is not being taken seriously enough. So we make the punishment harsher, or the rule’s enforcement stricter. The problem is that such an approach is satisfying to neither students nor professors. We don’t want to be punishers – and they don’t want to be the punished.

But punishment is not the simple answer. By this, I mean that it is not, by itself, a solution. Let’s recognize it as a part of a fuller answer, but not as a full answer in itself. One problem with this approach is that it regards cheating as a matter of individual behavior, perhaps individual character, but a broader view would see that cheating exists in a cheating culture. And if we are to solve the problem of cheating, it must be addressed at a cultural level.

The leads to the fourth and final part of the paper, in which I offer some practical suggestions about what we should do. The first thing that should be done is to follow the procedures outlined in the Assessment Guide that has been produced by the International Center for Academic Integrity. Here, there are step-by-step instructions for encouraging campus academic integrity. (Notice, by the way, that here the focus is on the positive -- the development of a culture of academic integrity to replace the negative culture of cheating and also the negative approach of punishment.) The “Assessment Guide” might better be titled “Establishing a Culture of Academic Integrity.” Specific instructions are given for calling together various people on campus – from student body leaders, to faculty, administrators, and those working in student affairs. Acting alone, these people are nearly powerless. But organized together, they can make a difference.

The so-called “Assessment Guide” describes the composition of various committees, sets out how often the committees should meet, and defines their charge. Since each campus institution is as different from another as one individual person is from another, the final results will vary from campus to campus and will be suited to the particular institution. Each campus institution has a unique history and set of traditions, and these can be tapped into as resources for growing and nurturing a culture of academic integrity. Finally, some specific and successful examples are examined.
Moral Elevation

Moral elevation, or elevation, is a specific emotional state triggered by witnessing a profound display of virtue. Elicitors of elevation are actions of others that are perceived as having moral beauty and great integrity. These include moments of unexpected benevolence, kindheartedness, altruistic deeds, and displays of gratitude among strangers. Our research centers on the psychological and physiological events that underlie the experience of elevation. Elevation leads to pro-social behaviors and feelings, including a boost in altruistic acts, compassion, warmth, optimism about humanity, desire to help others, and yearning to improve one’s character. Moreover, this emotional state recruits unique patterns of neural and autonomic nervous system activity. Altogether, this research illuminates the distinct mind-body coordinated events that accompany the unique emotional state of elevation.

Professional Responsibility:
Can We Teach Moral Courage in Health Care?

The importance of moral character is emphasized in both virtue ethics and moral behavior. The last step of moral behavior is moral character. While moral sensitivity and reasoning inform behavior, it doesn’t necessarily mean an action will materialize. Thus, the importance of moral character is very significant because it has the ability to initiate action, or to say it another way, it is the resolve and courage to follow through. Rest (1994) describes moral character as ego strength, perseverance, toughness, strength of conviction, and courage to do right.

Courage is one of the four cardinal virtues identified by the Greek philosophers. It is often referred to as the most important virtue because one needs it to defend the other three virtues: justice, temperance, wisdom. Professionalism requires the courage to hold true to beliefs, principles, and convictions. Historically, the focus of courage has been on physical courage, meaning the willingness to risk one’s life for a higher ideal. In fact, Aristotle suggested that the ability to face danger gladly was the purest form of courage. Such courage is a reactive state wherein one has no time to think. Thus, courage is considered a natural disposition.

In contrast, moral courage is one’s willingness to risk disgrace, as well as, social ridicule, marginalization, and disapproval for attending to one’s moral duties. So, can we teach moral courage? Perhaps, we can capture students’ attention and inspire them to act with courage by helping them to appreciate the importance of acting with courage and the disciplinary process. This presentation will focus on teaching strategies that empower the student through the development of a professional class code along with disciplinary actions when the class code is violated.

From a Student’s Perspective:

This fall my institution will offer a new First-Year seminar that focuses on ethical reasoning skills. Student learning outcomes for the course include:

- Identify ethical issues in subject- or discipline-based settings
• Apply ethical perspectives to contemporary issues
• Practice ethical reasoning skills through analysis of contemporary ethical problems.

To support faculty who will be developing and teaching this course, I offered a three-day Ethics Across the Curriculum workshop in May. I wanted to ground the faculty development experience by framing it in terms of expected student learning. In other words, I structured the workshop so as to put faculty in the position of students for the workshop. Part of this student-based experience was supported by developing a workbook that would focus our attention and energy on exercises and assessment. We spent considerable time in groups analyzing cases, stories, and models of ethical decision making. This student-based experience was also supported by having a student serve as co-facilitator of the workshop. I selected a student I had worked with for two years with Ethics Bowl.

The decision to make the EAC workshop a faculty-student collaboration proved to be the most important one I made in the design of the workshop. This essay will document this faculty-student collaboration and review the extraordinary faculty learning that took place as a result of student involvement and leadership.

Kim Skoog
University of Guam
Friday, October 4, 2:45pm (Agricultural Science)

The Morality of Martyrdom

If one examines the attitudes (particularly in the Western tradition) toward suicide and self-sacrifice or martyrdom, one is struck by an apparent contradictory position: while suicide is almost universally despised and condemned, martyrdom is regarded as one of humanity’s noblest laudable acts—in spite of the fact that both involved killing oneself. There are ways of course that one may try to distinguish these two acts in response to this observation, particularly in terms of the differing motivations and social implications of each type of act; yet, if one relies on sanctity of life or obedience to non-violence to condemn one and praise the other, then the problem of a prima facie inconsistency appears to persist.

In relation to this year’s conference theme, acts of martyrdom are generally regarded as courageous acts of defiance against oppression; based on one’s own conscience and/or sense of obligation to society, religion, or culture, it is an intentional act of self-sacrifice for the sake of others or some established institution.

Besides developing a working definition of “martyrdom,” this study will consider two recent books on the topic, where Adam Lankford (The Myth of Martyrdom) argues that modern “martyrs” such as suicide bombers are not different than other suicidal people, while Candida Moss (The Myth of Persecution) attempts to demonstrate that the “age of martyrs” in the Christian tradition is a myth. Thereafter, assuming real acts of martyrdom actually have occurred, we will consider if martyrdom can properly be distanced from suicide, and if so, how this affects the moral status of these acts.

The paper concludes with a brief comparison of specific, identified acts of martyrdom in the west (Islamic suicide bombers) with acts of alleged martyrdom in the east (Tibetan self-immolation). How can these two types of acts be assessed morally? Ultimately, we come back to the central question of when are acts of self–inflicted-death warranted and justified—if ever—and what sort of status (morally, spiritually, or socially) can they be given?
A New Ethics Curriculum for a New Medical School

The University of South Carolina opened a new medical school in the Fall of 2012 in Greenville, South Carolina. The new school seeks to set itself apart from others by employing a unique pedagogical approach that is highly interdisciplinary, involves extensive hands on experience and employs the latest educational technology. This is in service of an even more visionary goal: fostering the leadership and interpersonal skills its graduates will need to transform the face of medicine.

Since ethics is clearly vitally important to this effort, the University has contracted with the Rutland Institute for Ethics at Clemson University to design and coordinate the ethics portion of the curriculum. On the one hand, this is a rare and precious opportunity: to help design the curriculum for a medical school from the ground up, especially a medical school which takes the need for high quality ethics instruction seriously. On the other hand, the fact that not just the curriculum, but the entire school is being constructed de novo poses a number of major challenges. For example, medical schools have to teach students an enormous amount of information in a short amount of time. Ethics is important, but it’s very difficult to argue that students should spend 4 more hours on ethics at the expense of cardiac function.

What is really needed is a new approach to ethics education which emphasizes getting the maximum impact from every precious hour of classroom instruction. The Institute has long used a unique approach to ethics instruction that is well suited to this challenge. We believe that people do not need extensive training in the theoretical aspects of ethics that all too often clutter ethics instruction. There are some basic concepts that need to be learned and some common pitfalls to watch for, to be sure, but this can be covered relatively quickly. What students need most is to spend time actually thinking through complex ethical situations of the sort physicians confront in their clinical practice. In other words, medical ethics education should be biased strongly in favor of application and away from content.

We have just finished the first year of instruction for the inaugural class of 50 students. Results are mixed, with some triumphs, some challenges unresolved, and some defeats. We will report on this interesting journey, emphasizing lessons learned and our plans for the future.

“IT IS ALL ABOUT ME”:
The Role of Conscience in the Revelation of Self

What does conscience tell us about a person’s likely actions? We commonly believe it is an indicator of how we will act or a motivator to do good acts. A person of good conscience is one who can be counted on to know and do the right thing. If a person fails to do the right thing, his conscience bothers him and urges him to make amends or to avoid the same mistake in the future. I will argue that conscience is unreliable on both counts, but that conscience plays a much more reliable role in revealing the self and, in turn, the character of the agent.

I will begin by investigating the philosophical treatments of conscience. While philosophers have viewed conscience in a variety of ways, these different ways tend to fall roughly into two broad categories: conscience as a cognitive faculty or conscience as a conative or affective faculty. As a cognitive faculty, conscience is how one knows or discovers the morally correct action (one “consults his conscience”). Conscience as a conative or affective faculty gives a sense of discomfort or unease when one fails to do the morally right thing (one feels the “pangs of conscience”). Thomas Aquinas falls into the first category in which the conscience is an intellectual power of...
judgment. For Schopenhauer and Rousseau conscience is more of a feeling that urges us toward moral behavior (either before or after the act).

Whether we describe the conscience as an intellectual faculty or a feeling or desire similar problems arise if we are to count on conscience to lead to moral behavior. As an intellectual faculty, common sense shows us that it can fail. People can make mistakes about what is right; their conscience can lead them astray. If conscience is a feeling urging us to moral action or making us feel shame or regret, it too can be misplaced; but it also can be ineffective. As the common regret of a nagging conscience shows, conscience often calls to us after the fact. Therefore we must be able to resist it; indeed, we often do so. So even if conscience has the authority to pronounce what is moral, it does not provide adequate motivation to ensure moral action – even when it is good.

Absent a fully developed character, conscience itself may not ensure or improve moral behavior. However conscience plays an important role in revealing the ideal self and the true self of the actor. In this way it reveals more about the character of the actor than about the morality of his actions. While conscience can fail in correctly identifying the moral thing to do, it is a more reliable indicator of what the person believes is the right thing to do. As conscience is taken to be an impersonal determination of moral action, a person’s conscience shows us what he thinks is an ideal action; how a person should act; and how a person should be. This shows us part of what the person takes to be an ideal self and provides an important aspect of the self of that person (Frankfurt, Perry, Wolf). We can also compare the standards set by conscience with the person’s actions; this comparison reveals how the agent’s will and desires match and assist or conflict and resist the ideal self, revealing a true or actual self and a fuller picture of the agent’s character (Aristotle). Finally, I will use this model of assessment to analyze different characters.

Peggy Vandenber
Grand Valley State University
Thursday, October 3, 11:15am (Wells Fargo)

Joseph Butler on Conscience and Self-Love

Like Whitney Houston’s appeal in the 1980’s for the greatest love, 260 years earlier (1720’s), Anglican Bishop Joseph Butler also argued that people need to love themselves more. Butler’s erudite sermons given in England at Rolls Chapel, particularly the sermons I-V describe three aspects of human nature, conscience/reflection, affections and desires, and self and other love. The conscience wherein reflection occurs is the superior principle in human nature and has absolute authority over one’s course of action in response to one’s affections and desires. (17) These inclinations do not operate in theory for Butler but in response to objects in the world. We reach out for things we understand to be good for ourselves and our conscience reflects on whether it is in fact good for us. The problem with our decisions is often a case of not using our reflection properly to determine what inclination to act on and not enough self-love and concern for our well-being.

In Butler’s juxtaposition of our desires, self-love is a way of being, an active and basic principle for our reflection and conscience, and if we love ourselves more we would do more for others. Acting in loving ways with a concern for our neighbors is a desire or affection not unlike a taste for beer or pizza or for a good movie. For Butler, we do not act out of self-interest in a vacuum, rather our inclinations need to have an object for its satisfaction. We can in this process choose to act kindly towards our neighbor for our own satisfaction and in a self-loving way. We continue to act towards objects and reach for things that are good for us because we love our selves. The conscience guides our actions to benefit us and for our good and because we enjoy and appreciate others we see that benevolence is also a proper response to self-love.

Self and other love are not mutually independent for Butler but operate as different parts of our human nature and are not only compatible but a perfect combination. So it follows in Butler’s empirical description of human nature that the best citizens could very well be those who love themselves the most and use their reflection/conscience to choose between the best objects of their affections and desires.
My paper describes this story of human nature offered by Butler and expands to include how his theory of self-love needs to be moved out of the shadows of pejorative terms such as selfishness and egocentricity. It is a call to individual self-confidence and the development of each individual conscience as the basis for moral determination and participation in the community. Butler’s argument is not a simplistic call to the love of one’s self as the best course to the love of one’s neighbor. Rather he is calling everyone to respect their own conscience as the primary source of moral action and choices to “bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty (reflection), wait its determination, enforce upon ourselves its authority, make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent to conform ourselves to it. (17)” What follows from this consideration is a resulting conclusion that loving care for our neighbor is one of the best ways to satisfy our own self-love.

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**Mark Vopat**  
**Alan Tomhave**  
**Youngstown State University**  
**Thursday, October 3, 3:15pm (Weyerhauser)**

**The Business of Boycotting:**  
**Having Your Chicken and Eating It Too**  
We assume that there are certain causes that are morally wrong, worth speaking out against, and working to overcome, e.g., opposition to same sex marriage. This seems to suggest that we should also be boycotting certain businesses; particularly those whose owners advocate such views. Ideally, for the boycotter, this will end up silencing certain views (political or otherwise), but this seems to cause two basic problems. First, it appears initially to be coercive, because it threatens the existence of the business. Second, it runs counter to the intuition that we should not force unpopular opinions out of the marketplace of ideas. As Mill reminds us in On Liberty, even false ideas should see the light of day, if for no other reason than that light will serve to purge the idea from common acceptance.

This paper will consider several attempts at coming up with a principle that should guide such considerations and several possible types of responses (e.g., withholding financial support, making public statements, or sending letters to the business). In the end we will argue that in cases where businesses do more overall good than harm, boycotting for single issues is not morally required. Requiring boycotting in these cases exhibits an asymmetry in at least two areas. First, if we take companies to be analogous to persons in certain ways, and recognize that we associate with people who exhibit character flaws, then we are applying a different standard to businesses than to people. And second, we hold that boycotting businesses due to the political views of its owners or shareholders buys into a Milton Friedmansesque view that the primary concern in businesses is that of owners or shareholders, while ignoring the situation of employees. If a company is largely beneficial to employees (and perhaps to society generally), then it seems permissible to continue supporting businesses that exhibit some “character” flaws. The upshot of this view is that you may treat a company such as Chik-fil-A differently than you treat a company like WalMart.

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**Rebecca A. Wentworth**  
**Sam Houston State University**  
**Friday, October 4, 9:00am (Weyerhauser)**

**Breaking the Rules:**  
**Discussing an Education Code of Ethics with Pre-Service Teachers**  
Preparing pre-professionals for the workplace is arguably one of a university’s most important missions. Providing students with the knowledge and skills necessary for successfully navigating the work environment they will enter is the implicit and explicit goal of a wide variety of colleges and instructors.
The work of Gottlieb, Handelsmann, & Knapp (2008) discusses ethical acculturation by individuals entering new work settings or industries. They argue that individuals will ethically integrate, assimilate, separate, or marginalize, and their acculturation strategy will often be an element in their success or failure as a professional. Integration is considered the healthiest form of acculturation. To this end, we, the present authors, feel it is beneficial to make students aware of the ethical codes, explicit and implicit, in existence in secondary school settings to better prepare them for making the choice of becoming members of the teaching profession.

In the on-going effort to prepare education students to become effective teachers, the authors engage their students in lecture, conversations, and written reflection regarding the state Educator Code of Ethics. During anecdotal presentations using vignettes taken from personal experience, hearsay, Internet sources, and media headlines, students are asked to consider the behaviors of educators specifically as they relate to the Ethical Code for Educators. Additionally, students are asked to discuss the ethical code with their peers while considering behavior that crosses ethical boundaries while potentially serving the best interest of students.

As a culminating activity, students are asked to write a reflection on those portions of the ethical code they see as malleable, poorly written, or containing enough ambiguity as to provide the potential for misinterpretation by teachers, administrators, community members, parents, etc. The authors will present results of thematic qualitative analysis of essay responses. Themes include use of school resources for personal use, what constitutes ‘appropriate’ communication and relationships with students, grade inflation, and the use of threats and violence. Authentic student voices will be presented for consideration and discussion. Attendees will be encouraged to contribute to this on-going discussion.

Rebecca A. Wentworth
Sam Houston State University
Thursday, October 3, 3:15pm (Wells Fargo Room)

Sports and Ethics:
Character Curriculum Comparison

Sport and ethics have a symbiotic relationship. As a global institution, sport is a powerful force. There is nothing like sport to bring people together, impart valuable life skills, and provide unique and profound experiences. According to legendary basketball coach John Wooden, “Sports do not build character. They reveal it.” Prominent football coach Vince Lombardi stated, “Football is like life. It teaches work, sacrifice, perseverance, competitive drive, selflessness, and respect for authority.”

For many, these lofty words by coaching heroes ring hollow in today’s athletic climate. America is in a sports ethics crisis. Think, Johnny Manziel of Texas A&M, Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees, or the Penn State child sex abuse scandal. Lance Armstrong recently stated, "I went in and just looked up the definition of cheat and the definition of cheat is to gain an advantage on a rival or foe that they don't have. I didn't view it that way."

In response to what many perceive to be a gap in the ethical development of youth athletes, character education curricula are being designed by a variety of institutions for the purpose of redirecting young people toward stronger ethical messages, hoping to plant the seeds of conscience as well as provide the knowledge and skills required to respond to ethical dilemmas in socially appropriate manners. Often these curricula are delivered in health and kinesiology classrooms, leading to a sports and nutrition focus for the content.

The authors will present data from curriculum comparison, including discussion of ethical theoretical foundations, available materials, support for teachers and parents, cross-curricular connections, and program costs.
Conscience And Conscientious Objections In Health Care

While conscientious objection has its historical roots in objections to military service, a growing number of health professionals have refused to provide a broad range of medical services that violate their ethical beliefs. The presentation will identify the distinguishing characteristics of conscientious objection, and two extreme approaches to managing conscience-based objections to providing medical services will be critically analyzed. One extreme is “conscience absolutism,” the view that clinicians should be exempted from performing any action, including disclosing options and referring, that is contrary to their conscience. The second extreme is the “incompatibility thesis,” the view that practitioners have an obligation to provide any medical service that is legal, professionally accepted, and within the scope of their professional competence. It will be argued that neither of these extreme approaches is defensible. An alternative to both extreme approaches will be presented and applied to cases. It features the following guidelines: 1) Whenever feasible, health professionals should provide advance notification; 2) accommodation should not impede a patient’s/surrogate’s timely access to information, counseling, and referral; 3) accommodation should not impede a patient’s timely access to health care services; and 4) accommodation should not impose excessive burdens on other health professionals, administrators, or institutions.

Conscience and the Environment of the Future

How should we approach the discussion of ethical issues related to people who will exist in the future and the environment of the future? Given the current discussions related to environmental issues and the difficulties related to getting people engaged in working on environmental issues, it seems that we need to explore unique approaches to how to deal with these issues in terms of how they will affect those who will exist in the future.

One approach can employ the notion of conscience for helping to inaugurate this engagement. This will require that we define conscience. We will assume in this discussion that conscience is a faculty of mind that causes within us an uneasiness about something that we have done or failed to do. This is often linked to how we have behaved in the past. The question we will address is how does conscience relate to what we are doing in the present and what we will do in the future? If conscience involves a sense of guilt, shame, or remorse about what we’ve done or failed to do, how can this be related to people who will exist in the future?

A question that will be central in this discussion is how can our conscience be related to the environment of the future? In order to answer this question we will need to explore the relationship of ethical principles and standards to our conscience. This paper will explore the ways in which conscience can be related to ethical principles and to the environment of the future.

Conscience, Character, and Culture:
Necessary but not Sufficient Elements of Morality

The thesis of this paper is that conscience, character, and culture are each necessary for morality, but none is sufficient. Each pertains to one domain of ethics (internal, personal, and interpersonal), but ethics must include all three of these domains as well as practical wisdom.
First, I will argue that conscience, character, and culture, taken separately, are each not sufficient for morality. The weakness of Joseph Butler’s conscience-based ethics shows that conscience is not sufficient for morality, since people can act immorally with a clear conscience. Furthermore, as Jonathan Bennett showed in “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” people can also act morally with a guilty conscience. Conscience is based on what people perceive as moral or immoral; a guilty conscience may thus reflect an act that is perceived as immoral but is actually not immoral, and a clear conscience may result from an act that is perceived as morally permitted but is actually immoral. For these reasons, conscience is not sufficient for morality.

The insufficiency of character is reflected in recent criticisms of virtue ethics. As Peter Geach and others have noted, virtue ethics cannot explain why something is a virtue, or resolve conflicts between virtues. Traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics relies on an account of human flourishing and a view of the function of human beings that are not only dubious but cannot be derived from virtue ethics itself. Even the less ambitious virtue ethics of Alisdair MacIntyre relies on the assumption that the “internal goods” we can achieve through a practice are indeed morally acceptable goods. For these reasons, character is also insufficient.

No sustained argument is required to show that culture is not sufficient for morality; such arguments have been made by many ethicists who have attacked cultural relativism. Culture is, however, necessary for morality; this is shown not only by William James’ point that morality presupposes the existence of others, but also from the fact that morality is always learned and practiced in a culture. While the failure of cultural relativism shows that culture is not sufficient for morality, the fact that morality is inherently concerned with others shows that it is necessary.

Character is also necessary for morality. Contrary to recent “situationist” critics, character is real; its reality is shown clearly in David Hume’s example of a jailor whose character makes him impervious to the pleas of a prisoner. Situationist criticisms do not actually show that character is not real, but merely that it consists only of an increased likelihood to perform certain acts, rather than a certainty. Moral approval and disapproval are not only directed at actions or principles, but also at traits of character. Ethics is not only about what we ought to do and why we ought to do it, but also about how we ought to do it and who we ought to seek to become; these questions are only addressed through an evaluation of character.

Few would dispute that conscience is necessary for morality. Being a moral agent consists not only of a disposition to do certain things or to think certain things, but also of a tendency to feel certain things, particularly to feel guilty upon performing immoral acts. Taken separately, conscience, character, and culture are necessary but not sufficient elements of morality. Taken together, with the addition of reasoning or practical wisdom, they constitute a complete or comprehensive approach to morality. Taking them as elements of a comprehensive approach to morality also reveals the ways in which conscience, culture, and character are related to each other, as well as the need for practical reasoning to resolve conflicts within and between them.

Dan Wueste
Clemson University
Thursday, October 3, 10:15am (Agricultural Science)

Vulnerability, Preventability, and Responsibility:
Exploring Some Normative Implications of the Human Condition

Rana Plaza, an eight story building in Savar, a suburb of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, collapsed on the 24th of April. The building was home to five garment factories and some 3,000 workers. With a death toll of 1,127, the collapse of Rana Plaza is the deadliest accident in the history of the garment industry. Sad to say, deadly accidents are nothing new to the garment industry, not only in Bangladesh (in November 2012, for instance, more than 100 garment workers perished in a fire at Tazreen Fashions also near Dhaka but wherever the industry has flourished. For example, as M.T. Anderson observes, garment industry disasters like Rana Plaza happened here in the United States during “the first phase of our national industrialization — the 1878
Washburn mill explosion in Minneapolis, the 1905 Grover Shoe Factory disaster in Brockton, Mass., the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in Manhattan — but...the most notorious was the 1860 collapse of the Pemberton Mill in Lawrence, Mass.” In the afternoon, on January 10th 1860, the Pemberton Building began to shudder. Flimsy iron columns, which had been known to be unsafe for years, but which would have been costly to replace, supported the upper floors of the building. The weaving machines, too many of them, had fallen into rhythm: “and the building tore itself apart. The columns cracked, the floors splayed, the walls bulged and then burst outward, and a hideous cataract of timber, men, women, working children and iron machines collapsed into a heap of blood and crushing tonnage.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/opinion/bangladesh-needs-strong-unions-not-outside-pressure.html?pagewanted=all

Then, as now, such a tragedy raised vexing questions about responsibility, in the sense of liability (which presupposes culpability); and regulation, in particular, about its feasibility, justification, effectiveness, and consequences for the regulated businesses, workers, and the economies of which they are a part. These are important and difficult questions. In Bangladesh, for instance, which is second only to China in exports of apparel, this is especially true because economic progress has been closely tied to the growth of the garment industry. Writing about his country, as rescuers were still searching for survivors of the Rana Plaza collapse, Fazeel Hasan Abed put the point this way in an op-ed in the New York Times: “Economic opportunities from the garment industry have played an important role in making social change possible in my country, with about three million women now working in the garment sector..... families living in poverty have changed their vision of the future. More have acquired long-term goals, like educating their sons and daughters, saving and taking microloans to start new businesses, and building and maintaining more sanitary living spaces.”


One salutary feature of Abed’s op ed is that rather than engaging in the popular but only marginally useful game of blame (find the bad guy; “string him up”), he directs attention to steps that may ameliorate the problems of worker safety in Bangladesh.

In this discussion, like Abed, I will put aside questions of responsibility that presuppose blameworthiness. I will focus instead on responsibility in the sense of what one ought ethically to do, which, I should say, nearly, if not completely, tracks with the query what one can be reasonably expected to do. The idea I will be pursuing is that looking at the features of a situation that prompt one to think about responsibility may cast some light on how one ought to go about determining what one’s responsibilities are. The recent major garment industry disasters in Bangladesh (Rana Plaza, the November 2012 fire at Tazreen Fashions) share three features: they were preventable


the cost of prevention in each case would have been small


and resistance to preventative measures was strong and they were, accordingly, not taken.


In this, and in being horrific, they are quite like the Pemberton Mill disaster discussed briefly above. They resemble Pemberton in another way. The workers — the victims— were vulnerable, because, among other things, they needed the work and were better off for having it. However, and consequently, just as they were in no position to negotiate or demand better wages, they were in no position to negotiate or demand safer working conditions.

Here, then, we stand at the intersection of three value-laden ideas: vulnerability, preventability, and responsibility. Two of these, namely, vulnerability and responsibility, are, as it were, inherent in the human condition. All of us, though we do often forget it, are vulnerable in some measure. And, with very few exceptions, for example, the very young and those who have severe cognitive impairments, we all have responsibilities. There are, in other words, things that it is our responsibility to do (i.e., that we are rightly expected to do) as, for example, a friend, spouse, parent, professional (e.g., architect or doctor), or manager. The third idea, preventability, is tied to the human condition in that whether something is preventable turns, in the end, on the reach of our control in a situation. In part, control is a matter of physical wherewithal, but the larger part, to use Peter Drucker’s terminology, is a matter of competence and authority. [Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (New York: Harper and Row, 1973. p. 102.) Post-Capitalist Society (New York: HarperCollins, 1993. pp. 347-48.]]
The question then appears to be something like this: Could it be that responsibility is in some sense a function of the two factors called out above in discussing the garment industry disasters, namely, vulnerability and preventability? Supposing that the answer is yes, we might say that responsibility (understood in terms of legitimate normative expectations about action) increases with the vulnerability of the persons and the extent to which harm is preventable in a situation. The ethical principle suggested by this is that (a) when harm is within an agent’s/organization’s ambit of competence and authority and (b) it can be prevented (without substantial cost comparable to and greater than the cost of the preventable harm), it is the agent’s/organization’s responsibility to take steps to prevent it. This principle implies that, for example, retailers contracting with garment manufacturers in Bangladesh have a responsibility to take steps to make garment factories safer places to work (If we could travel back in time, we’d find ourselves saying the same thing about the situation in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1860). Again, I will be exploring the idea that we may learn something about how one ought to go about determining what one’s responsibilities are through careful consideration of the features of a situation that prompt one to think about responsibility. My hope is to prompt others to join me in exploring this possibility by, for example, discussing objections/questions about the principle, for example, is it too strong (in the sense that it implies responsibilities that no one playing with a full deck could accept or reasonably expect others to fulfill)? Is it unrealistic? Does it ignore critical factors or conflict with other sound principles?